ReactOS 0.4.15-dev-5669-g09dde2c
security.c
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1/*
2 * PROJECT: ReactOS Kernel
3 * LICENSE: GPL - See COPYING in the top level directory
4 * FILE: ntoskrnl/ps/security.c
5 * PURPOSE: Process Manager: Process/Thread Security
6 * PROGRAMMERS: Alex Ionescu (alex.ionescu@reactos.org)
7 * Eric Kohl
8 * Thomas Weidenmueller (w3seek@reactos.org)
9 */
10
11/* INCLUDES ******************************************************************/
12
13#include <ntoskrnl.h>
14#define NDEBUG
15#include <debug.h>
16
18
19VOID
24);
25
26/* PRIVATE FUNCTIONS *********************************************************/
27
28VOID
31{
32 PAGED_CODE();
33 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Process: %p\n", Process);
34
35 /* Check if we have a token */
36 if (Process->Token.Object)
37 {
38 /* Deassign it */
40 Process->Token.Object = NULL;
41 }
42}
43
44VOID
47{
49 PAGED_CODE();
50 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Thread: %p\n", Thread);
51
52 /* Check if we have active impersonation info */
54 {
55 /* Dereference its token */
56 ObDereferenceObject(ImpersonationInfo->Token);
57 }
58
59 /* Check if we have impersonation info */
60 if (ImpersonationInfo)
61 {
62 /* Free it */
63 ExFreePool(ImpersonationInfo);
66 }
67}
68
73{
75 PTOKEN NewToken, ParentToken;
76 PAGED_CODE();
77 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Process: %p\n", Process);
78
79 /* If we have a parent, then duplicate the Token */
80 if (Parent)
81 {
82 /* Get the Parent Token */
83 ParentToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(Parent);
84
85 /* Duplicate it */
86 Status = SeSubProcessToken(ParentToken,
87 &NewToken,
88 TRUE,
90
91 /* Dereference the Parent */
92 ObFastDereferenceObject(&Parent->Token, ParentToken);
93
94 /* Set the new Token */
95 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
96 {
97 /* Initailize the fast reference */
98 ObInitializeFastReference(&Process->Token, NewToken);
99 }
100 }
101 else
102 {
103 /* No parent, assign the Boot Token */
106 }
107
108 /* Return to caller */
109 return Status;
110}
111
113NTAPI
115 IN PETHREAD CurrentThread)
116{
118 PTEB Teb;
120 BOOLEAN IsImpersonating;
122 PAGED_CODE();
123 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Thread: %p\n", Thread);
124
125 /* Sanity check */
126 ASSERT(CurrentThread == PsGetCurrentThread());
127
128 /* Get process and TEB */
129 Process = Thread->ThreadsProcess;
130 Teb = Thread->Tcb.Teb;
131 if (Teb)
132 {
133 /* Check if we're not in the right process */
134 if (Thread->Tcb.ApcState.Process != &Process->Pcb)
135 {
136 /* Attach to the process */
138 Attached = TRUE;
139 }
140
141 /* Check if we're in a different thread or acquire rundown */
142 if ((Thread == CurrentThread) ||
144 {
145 /* Check if the thread is impersonating */
146 IsImpersonating = (BOOLEAN)Thread->ActiveImpersonationInfo;
147 if (IsImpersonating)
148 {
149 /* Set TEB data */
150 Teb->ImpersonationLocale = -1;
151 Teb->IsImpersonating = 1;
152 }
153 else
154 {
155 /* Set TEB data */
156 Teb->ImpersonationLocale = 0;
157 Teb->IsImpersonating = 0;
158 }
159 }
160
161 /* Check if we're in a different thread */
162 if (Thread != CurrentThread)
163 {
164 /* Release protection */
166 }
167
168 /* Detach */
170 }
171
172 /* Return to caller */
173 return STATUS_SUCCESS;
174}
175
177NTAPI
180 IN PACCESS_TOKEN AccessToken OPTIONAL)
181{
182 PACCESS_TOKEN NewToken = AccessToken, OldToken;
184 PAGED_CODE();
185 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Process: %p Token: %p\n", Process, Token);
186
187 /* Check if we don't have a pointer */
188 if (!AccessToken)
189 {
190 /* Reference it from the handle */
195 &NewToken,
196 NULL);
197 if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) return Status;
198 }
199
200 /* Exchange tokens */
201 Status = SeExchangePrimaryToken(Process, NewToken, &OldToken);
202
203 /* Acquire and release the lock */
206
207 /* Dereference Tokens and Return */
208 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status)) ObDereferenceObject(OldToken);
209 if (!AccessToken) ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
210 return Status;
211}
212
214NTAPI
218{
220 BOOLEAN IsChildOrSibling;
221 PACCESS_TOKEN NewToken = Token;
223 BOOLEAN Result, SdAllocated;
226
227 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Process: %p Token: %p\n", Process, Token);
228
229 /* Reference the token by handle if we don't already have a token object */
230 if (!Token)
231 {
236 (PVOID*)&NewToken,
237 NULL);
238 if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) return Status;
239 }
240
241 /*
242 * Check whether this token is a child or sibling of the current process token.
243 * NOTE: On Windows Vista+ both of these checks (together with extra steps)
244 * are now performed by a new SeIsTokenAssignableToProcess() helper.
245 */
246 Status = SeIsTokenChild(NewToken, &IsChildOrSibling);
247 if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
248 {
249 /* Failed, dereference */
250 if (!Token) ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
251 return Status;
252 }
253 if (!IsChildOrSibling)
254 {
255 Status = SeIsTokenSibling(NewToken, &IsChildOrSibling);
256 if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
257 {
258 /* Failed, dereference */
259 if (!Token) ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
260 return Status;
261 }
262 }
263
264 /* Check if this was an independent token */
265 if (!IsChildOrSibling)
266 {
267 /* Make sure we have the privilege to assign a new one */
270 {
271 /* Failed, dereference */
272 if (!Token) ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
274 }
275 }
276
277 /* Assign the token */
279 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
280 {
281 /*
282 * We need to completely reverify if the process still has access to
283 * itself under this new token.
284 */
287 &SdAllocated);
288 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
289 {
290 /* Setup the security context */
291 SubjectContext.ProcessAuditId = Process;
293 SubjectContext.ClientToken = NULL;
294
295 /* Do the access check */
298 FALSE,
300 0,
301 NULL,
304 &Process->GrantedAccess,
305 &AccessStatus);
306
307 /* Dereference the token and let go the SD */
309 SubjectContext.PrimaryToken);
311
312 /* Remove access if it failed */
313 if (!Result) Process->GrantedAccess = 0;
314
315 /* Setup granted access */
316 Process->GrantedAccess |= (PROCESS_VM_OPERATION |
327 }
328
329 /*
330 * In case LUID device maps are enable, we may not be using
331 * system device map for this process, but a logon LUID based
332 * device map. Because we change primary token, this usage is
333 * no longer valid, so dereference the process device map
334 */
336 }
337
338 /* Dereference the token */
339 if (!Token) ObDereferenceObject(NewToken);
340 return Status;
341}
342
343/* FUNCTIONS *****************************************************************/
344
345/*
346 * @implemented
347 */
349NTAPI
353{
354 /* Call the newer API */
357 0,
359}
360
361/*
362 * @implemented
363 */
365NTAPI
370{
372 HANDLE hToken;
375 PAGED_CODE();
377 "Process: %p DesiredAccess: %lx\n", ProcessHandle, DesiredAccess);
378
379 /* Check if caller was user-mode */
381 {
382 /* Enter SEH for probing */
384 {
385 /* Probe the token handle */
387 }
389 {
390 /* Return the exception code */
392 }
393 _SEH2_END;
394 }
395
396 /* Validate object attributes */
398
399 /* Open the process token */
401 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
402 {
403 /* Reference it by handle and dereference the pointer */
406 NULL,
410 &hToken);
412
413 /* Make sure we got a handle */
414 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
415 {
416 /* Enter SEH for write */
418 {
419 /* Return the handle */
420 *TokenHandle = hToken;
421 }
423 {
424 /* Get exception code */
426 }
427 _SEH2_END;
428 }
429 }
430
431 /* Return status */
432 return Status;
433}
434
435/*
436 * @implemented
437 */
439NTAPI
441{
443 PAGED_CODE();
444 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Process: %p\n", Process);
445
446 /* Fast Reference the Token */
448
449 /* Check if we got the Token or if we got locked */
450 if (!Token)
451 {
452 /* Lock the Process */
454
455 /* Do a Locked Fast Reference */
457
458 /* Unlock the Process */
460 }
461
462 /* Return the Token */
463 return Token;
464}
465
466/*
467 * @implemented
468 */
470NTAPI
473{
476 PAGED_CODE();
477 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Process: %p\n", ProcessHandle);
478
479 /* Get the Token */
484 (PVOID*)&Process,
485 NULL);
486 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
487 {
488 /* Reference the token and dereference the process */
491 }
492
493 /* Return */
494 return Status;
495}
496
497/*
498 * @implemented
499 */
501NTAPI
504{
508 PAGED_CODE();
509 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Thread: %p Token: %p\n", Thread, TokenHandle);
510
511 /* Check if we were given a handle */
512 if (!TokenHandle)
513 {
514 /* Undo impersonation */
516 return STATUS_SUCCESS;
517 }
518
519 /* Get the token object */
524 (PVOID*)&Token,
525 NULL);
526 if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status)) return(Status);
527
528 /* Make sure it's an impersonation token */
530 {
531 /* Fail */
534 }
535
536 /* Get the impersonation level */
538
539 /* Call the impersonation API */
541 Token,
542 FALSE,
543 FALSE,
545
546 /* Dereference the token and return status */
548 return Status;
549}
550
551/*
552 * @implemented
553 */
554VOID
555NTAPI
557{
558 /* Call the per-thread API */
559 PAGED_CODE();
561}
562
563/*
564 * @implemented
565 */
566VOID
567NTAPI
569{
570 PTOKEN Token = NULL;
571 PAGED_CODE();
572 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Thread: %p\n", Thread);
573
574 /* Make sure we had impersonation information */
576 {
577 /* Lock the thread security */
579
580 /* Make sure it's still active */
582 {
583 /* Disable impersonation */
585
586 /* Get the token */
588 }
589
590 /* Release thread security */
592
593 /* Check if we had a token */
594 if (Token)
595 {
596 /* Dereference the impersonation token */
598
599 /* Write impersonation info to the TEB */
601 }
602 }
603}
604
605/*
606 * @implemented
607 */
609NTAPI
615{
616 PPS_IMPERSONATION_INFORMATION Impersonation, OldData;
617 PTOKEN OldToken = NULL, ProcessToken = NULL;
618 PACCESS_TOKEN NewToken, ImpersonationToken;
619 PEJOB Job;
621
622 PAGED_CODE();
623 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Thread: %p, Token: %p\n", Thread, Token);
624
625 /* Check if we don't have a token */
626 if (!Token)
627 {
628 /* Make sure we're impersonating */
630 {
631 /* We seem to be, lock the thread */
633
634 /* Make sure we're still impersonating */
636 {
637 /* Disable impersonation */
640
641 /* Get the token */
642 OldToken = Thread->ImpersonationInfo->Token;
643 }
644
645 /* Unlock the process and write TEB information */
648 }
649 }
650 else
651 {
652 /* Check if we have impersonation info */
653 Impersonation = Thread->ImpersonationInfo;
654 if (!Impersonation)
655 {
656 /* We need to allocate a new one */
657 Impersonation = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(PagedPool,
658 sizeof(*Impersonation),
660 if (!Impersonation) return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
661
662 /* Update the pointer */
664 ImpersonationInfo,
665 Impersonation,
666 NULL);
667 if (OldData)
668 {
669 /* Someone beat us to it, free our copy */
671 Impersonation = OldData;
672 }
673 }
674
675 /*
676 * Assign the token we get from the caller first. The reason
677 * we have to do that is because we're unsure if we can impersonate
678 * in the first place. In the scenario where we cannot then the
679 * last resort is to make a copy of the token and assign that newly
680 * token to the impersonation information.
681 */
682 ImpersonationToken = Token;
683
684 /* Obtain a token from the process */
685 ProcessToken = PsReferencePrimaryToken(Thread->ThreadsProcess);
686 if (!ProcessToken)
687 {
688 /* We can't continue this way without having the process' token... */
689 return STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
690 }
691
692 /* Make sure we can impersonate */
693 if (!SeTokenCanImpersonate(ProcessToken,
694 Token,
696 {
697 /* We can't, make a copy of the token instead */
701 &NewToken);
702 if (!NT_SUCCESS(Status))
703 {
704 /* We can't even make a copy of the token? Then bail out... */
705 ObFastDereferenceObject(&Thread->ThreadsProcess->Token, ProcessToken);
706 return Status;
707 }
708
709 /* Since we cannot impersonate, assign the newly copied token */
710 ImpersonationToken = NewToken;
711 }
712
713 /* We no longer need the process' token */
714 ObFastDereferenceObject(&Thread->ThreadsProcess->Token, ProcessToken);
715
716 /* Check if this is a job */
717 Job = Thread->ThreadsProcess->Job;
718 if (Job != NULL)
719 {
720 /* No admin allowed in this job */
722 SeTokenIsAdmin(ImpersonationToken))
723 {
725 }
726
727 /* No restricted tokens allowed in this job */
729 SeTokenIsRestricted(ImpersonationToken))
730 {
732 }
733
734 /* We don't support job filters yet */
735 if (Job->Filter != NULL)
736 {
737 ASSERT(Job->Filter == NULL);
738 }
739 }
740
741 /* Lock thread security */
743
744 /* Check if we're impersonating */
746 {
747 /* Get the token */
748 OldToken = Impersonation->Token;
749 }
750 else
751 {
752 /* Otherwise, enable impersonation */
754 }
755
756 /* Now fill it out */
757 Impersonation->ImpersonationLevel = ImpersonationLevel;
758 Impersonation->CopyOnOpen = CopyOnOpen;
759 Impersonation->EffectiveOnly = EffectiveOnly;
760 Impersonation->Token = ImpersonationToken;
761 ObReferenceObject(ImpersonationToken);
762
763 /* Unlock the thread */
765
766 /* Write impersonation info to the TEB */
768 }
769
770 /* Dereference the token and return success */
771 if (OldToken) PsDereferenceImpersonationToken(OldToken);
772 return STATUS_SUCCESS;
773}
774
775/*
776 * @implemented
777 */
779NTAPI
784{
787
788 PAGED_CODE();
789
791 "Thread: %p, TokenType: %p\n", Thread, TokenType);
792
793 /* Check if we don't have impersonation info */
794 Process = Thread->ThreadsProcess;
796 {
797 /* Lock the Process */
799
800 /* Make sure impersonation is still active */
802 {
803 /* Get the token */
806
807 /* Return data to caller */
811
812 /* Unlock the Process */
814 return Token;
815 }
816
817 /* Unlock the Process */
819 }
820
821 /* Fast Reference the Token */
823
824 /* Check if we got the Token or if we got locked */
825 if (!Token)
826 {
827 /* Lock the Process */
829
830 /* Do a Locked Fast Reference */
832
833 /* Unlock the Process */
835 }
836
837 /* Return the token */
840 // NOTE: ImpersonationLevel is left untouched on purpose!
841 return Token;
842}
843
844/*
845 * @implemented
846 */
848NTAPI
853{
854 PTOKEN Token = NULL;
855 PAGED_CODE();
856 PSTRACE(PS_SECURITY_DEBUG, "Thread: %p\n", Thread);
857
858 /* If we don't have impersonation info, just quit */
859 if (!Thread->ActiveImpersonationInfo) return NULL;
860
861 /* Lock the thread */
863
864 /* Make sure we still have active impersonation */
866 {
867 /* Return data from caller */
872
873 /* Set the token */
875 }
876
877 /* Unlock thread and return impersonation token */
879 return Token;
880}
881
882#undef PsDereferenceImpersonationToken
883/*
884 * @implemented
885 */
886VOID
887NTAPI
889{
890 PAGED_CODE();
891
892 /* If we got a token, dereference it */
893 if (ImpersonationToken) ObDereferenceObject(ImpersonationToken);
894}
895
896#undef PsDereferencePrimaryToken
897/*
898 * @implemented
899 */
900VOID
901NTAPI
903{
904 PAGED_CODE();
905
906 /* Dereference the token*/
907 ObDereferenceObject(PrimaryToken);
908}
909
910/*
911 * @implemented
912 */
914NTAPI
917{
918 PPS_IMPERSONATION_INFORMATION Impersonation = NULL;
920 PAGED_CODE();
922 "Thread: %p State: %p\n", Thread, ImpersonationState);
923
924 /* Check if we don't have impersonation */
926 {
927 /* Lock thread security */
929
930 /* Disable impersonation */
933
934 /* Make sure nobody disabled it behind our back */
936 {
937 /* Copy the old state */
938 Impersonation = Thread->ImpersonationInfo;
939 ImpersonationState->Token = Impersonation->Token;
940 ImpersonationState->CopyOnOpen = Impersonation->CopyOnOpen;
943 }
944
945 /* Unlock thread security */
947
948 /* If we had impersonation info, return true */
949 if (Impersonation) return TRUE;
950 }
951
952 /* Clear everything */
957 return FALSE;
958}
959
960/*
961 * @implemented
962 */
963VOID
964NTAPI
967{
968 PTOKEN Token = NULL;
969 PPS_IMPERSONATION_INFORMATION Impersonation;
970 PAGED_CODE();
972 "Thread: %p State: %p\n", Thread, ImpersonationState);
973
974 /* Lock thread security */
976
977 /* Get the impersonation info */
978 Impersonation = Thread->ImpersonationInfo;
979
980 /* Check if we're impersonating */
982 {
983 /* Get the token */
984 Token = Impersonation->Token;
985 }
986
987 /* Check if we have an impersonation state */
989 {
990 /* Fill out the impersonation info */
992 Impersonation->CopyOnOpen = ImpersonationState->CopyOnOpen;
994 Impersonation->Token = ImpersonationState->Token;
995
996 /* Enable impersonation */
998 }
999 else
1000 {
1001 /* Disable impersonation */
1003 }
1004
1005 /* Unlock the thread */
1007
1008 /* Dereference the token */
1010}
1011
1013NTAPI
1015 IN HANDLE ThreadToImpersonateHandle,
1016 IN PSECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE SecurityQualityOfService)
1017{
1018 SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE SafeServiceQoS;
1021 PETHREAD ThreadToImpersonate;
1024 PAGED_CODE();
1026 "Threads: %p %p\n", ThreadHandle, ThreadToImpersonateHandle);
1027
1028 /* Check if call came from user mode */
1029 if (PreviousMode != KernelMode)
1030 {
1031 /* Enter SEH for probing */
1032 _SEH2_TRY
1033 {
1034 /* Probe QoS */
1035 ProbeForRead(SecurityQualityOfService,
1037 sizeof(ULONG));
1038
1039 /* Capture it */
1040 SafeServiceQoS = *SecurityQualityOfService;
1041 SecurityQualityOfService = &SafeServiceQoS;
1042 }
1044 {
1045 /* Return the exception code */
1047 }
1048 _SEH2_END;
1049 }
1050
1051 /* Reference the thread */
1052 Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(ThreadHandle,
1056 (PVOID*)&Thread,
1057 NULL);
1058 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
1059 {
1060 /* Reference the impersonating thead */
1061 Status = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(ThreadToImpersonateHandle,
1065 (PVOID*)&ThreadToImpersonate,
1066 NULL);
1067 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
1068 {
1069 /* Create a client security context */
1070 Status = SeCreateClientSecurity(ThreadToImpersonate,
1071 SecurityQualityOfService,
1072 0,
1073 &ClientContext);
1074 if (NT_SUCCESS(Status))
1075 {
1076 /* Do the impersonation */
1078 if (ClientContext.ClientToken)
1079 {
1080 /* Dereference the client token if we had one */
1082 }
1083 }
1084
1085 /* Dereference the thread to impersonate */
1086 ObDereferenceObject(ThreadToImpersonate);
1087 }
1088
1089 /* Dereference the main thread */
1091 }
1092
1093 /* Return status */
1094 return Status;
1095}
1096/* EOF */
#define PAGED_CODE()
#define STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD
Definition: DriverTester.h:9
unsigned char BOOLEAN
BOOLEAN NTAPI SeAccessCheck(_In_ PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor, _In_ PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext, _In_ BOOLEAN SubjectContextLocked, _In_ ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, _In_ ACCESS_MASK PreviouslyGrantedAccess, _Out_ PPRIVILEGE_SET *Privileges, _In_ PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping, _In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE AccessMode, _Out_ PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess, _Out_ PNTSTATUS AccessStatus)
Determines whether security access rights can be given to an object depending on the security descrip...
Definition: accesschk.c:910
ACPI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS ACPI_SIZE BOOLEAN Warn UINT32 *TableIdx UINT32 ACPI_TABLE_HEADER *OutTableHeader ACPI_TABLE_HEADER **OutTable ACPI_HANDLE UINT32 ACPI_WALK_CALLBACK ACPI_WALK_CALLBACK void void **ReturnValue UINT32 ACPI_BUFFER *RetPathPtr ACPI_OBJECT_HANDLER void *Data ACPI_OBJECT_HANDLER void **Data ACPI_STRING ACPI_OBJECT_LIST ACPI_BUFFER *ReturnObjectBuffer ACPI_DEVICE_INFO **ReturnBuffer ACPI_HANDLE Parent
Definition: acpixf.h:732
LONG NTSTATUS
Definition: precomp.h:26
#define NULL
Definition: types.h:112
#define TRUE
Definition: types.h:120
#define FALSE
Definition: types.h:117
#define NT_SUCCESS(StatCode)
Definition: apphelp.c:32
#define ExAllocatePoolWithTag(hernya, size, tag)
Definition: env_spec_w32.h:350
#define PsGetCurrentThread()
Definition: env_spec_w32.h:81
#define ExFreePool(addr)
Definition: env_spec_w32.h:352
#define PagedPool
Definition: env_spec_w32.h:308
#define ExReleaseRundownProtection
Definition: ex.h:135
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Definition: ex.h:139
#define ExAcquireRundownProtection
Definition: ex.h:134
VOID NTAPI ProbeForRead(IN CONST VOID *Address, IN SIZE_T Length, IN ULONG Alignment)
Definition: exintrin.c:102
#define _SEH2_END
Definition: filesup.c:22
#define _SEH2_TRY
Definition: filesup.c:19
_In_opt_ PFILE_OBJECT _In_opt_ PETHREAD Thread
Definition: fltkernel.h:2653
_Inout_ PLIST_ENTRY _In_ PVOID _In_ PSTRING _In_ BOOLEAN _In_ BOOLEAN _In_ ULONG _In_ PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA _In_opt_ PCHECK_FOR_TRAVERSE_ACCESS _In_opt_ PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectContext
Definition: fltkernel.h:2246
_Must_inspect_result_ _In_ PLARGE_INTEGER _In_ PLARGE_INTEGER _In_ ULONG _In_ PFILE_OBJECT _In_ PVOID Process
Definition: fsrtlfuncs.h:223
SHORT OldFlags
Definition: fxioqueue.cpp:1325
Status
Definition: gdiplustypes.h:25
#define EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER
Definition: excpt.h:85
#define PROCESS_TERMINATE
Definition: pstypes.h:157
#define PROCESS_VM_READ
Definition: pstypes.h:161
#define CT_ACTIVE_IMPERSONATION_INFO_BIT
Definition: pstypes.h:241
#define PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
Definition: pstypes.h:166
#define JOB_OBJECT_SECURITY_RESTRICTED_TOKEN
Definition: pstypes.h:231
#define THREAD_IMPERSONATE
Definition: pstypes.h:151
#define PROCESS_VM_WRITE
Definition: pstypes.h:162
#define THREAD_DIRECT_IMPERSONATION
Definition: pstypes.h:152
#define PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD
Definition: pstypes.h:158
#define PROCESS_VM_OPERATION
Definition: pstypes.h:160
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Definition: pstypes.h:230
#define PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION
Definition: pstypes.h:165
#define PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS
Definition: pstypes.h:163
#define PROCESS_SET_QUOTA
Definition: pstypes.h:164
#define PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE
#define InterlockedCompareExchangePointer
Definition: interlocked.h:129
if(dx< 0)
Definition: linetemp.h:194
enum _SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL
@ SecurityAnonymous
Definition: lsa.idl:55
@ SecurityIdentification
Definition: lsa.idl:56
enum _SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL * PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL
#define ASSERT(a)
Definition: mode.c:44
#define ExFreePoolWithTag(_P, _T)
Definition: module.h:1099
@ TokenImpersonation
Definition: imports.h:274
@ TokenPrimary
Definition: imports.h:273
NTKERNELAPI TOKEN_TYPE NTAPI SeTokenType(IN PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
NTKERNELAPI VOID NTAPI SeImpersonateClient(IN PSECURITY_CLIENT_CONTEXT ClientContext, IN PETHREAD ServerThread OPTIONAL)
NTKERNELAPI NTSTATUS NTAPI SeCreateClientSecurity(IN PETHREAD Thread, IN PSECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE QualityOfService, IN BOOLEAN RemoteClient, OUT PSECURITY_CLIENT_CONTEXT ClientContext)
#define PsDereferencePrimaryToken(T)
Definition: imports.h:301
#define PsDereferenceImpersonationToken(T)
Definition: imports.h:298
static BOOLEAN
Definition: security.c:109
#define KernelMode
Definition: asm.h:34
#define KeGetPreviousMode()
Definition: ketypes.h:1108
_In_ HANDLE ProcessHandle
Definition: mmfuncs.h:403
_In_ HANDLE _In_opt_ HANDLE _Out_opt_ PHANDLE _In_ ACCESS_MASK _In_ ULONG HandleAttributes
Definition: obfuncs.h:433
_In_ ACCESS_MASK _In_ ULONG _Out_ PHANDLE TokenHandle
Definition: psfuncs.h:718
_In_ ACCESS_MASK _In_opt_ POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES _In_ BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly
Definition: sefuncs.h:403
_In_ ACCESS_MASK _In_opt_ POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES _In_ BOOLEAN _In_ TOKEN_TYPE TokenType
Definition: sefuncs.h:404
_In_ PVOID ClientContext
Definition: netioddk.h:55
ULONG ACCESS_MASK
Definition: nt_native.h:40
#define STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL
Definition: nt_native.h:69
#define MAXIMUM_ALLOWED
Definition: nt_native.h:83
ULONG NTAPI MmGetSessionId(IN PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: session.c:179
_Out_ PKAPC_STATE ApcState
Definition: mm.h:1727
BOOLEAN NTAPI SeTokenCanImpersonate(_In_ PTOKEN ProcessToken, _In_ PTOKEN TokenToImpersonate, _In_ SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel)
Ensures that client impersonation can occur by checking if the token we're going to assign as the imp...
Definition: token.c:1969
NTSTATUS NTAPI SeCopyClientToken(_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token, _In_ SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL Level, _In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode, _Out_ PACCESS_TOKEN *NewToken)
Copies an existing access token (technically duplicating a new one).
Definition: token.c:1296
const LUID SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege
Definition: priv.c:22
NTSTATUS NTAPI SeSubProcessToken(_In_ PTOKEN Parent, _Out_ PTOKEN *Token, _In_ BOOLEAN InUse, _In_ ULONG SessionId)
Subtracts a token in exchange of duplicating a new one.
Definition: token.c:1127
NTSTATUS NTAPI SeIsTokenSibling(_In_ PTOKEN Token, _Out_ PBOOLEAN IsSibling)
Checks if the token is a sibling of the other token of the current process that the calling thread is...
Definition: token.c:1236
NTSTATUS NTAPI SeExchangePrimaryToken(_In_ PEPROCESS Process, _In_ PACCESS_TOKEN NewAccessToken, _Out_ PACCESS_TOKEN *OldAccessToken)
Replaces the old access token of a process (pointed by the EPROCESS kernel structure) with a new acce...
Definition: token.c:846
NTSTATUS NTAPI SeIsTokenChild(_In_ PTOKEN Token, _Out_ PBOOLEAN IsChild)
Checks if the token is a child of the other token of the current process that the calling thread is i...
Definition: token.c:1187
VOID NTAPI SeDeassignPrimaryToken(_Inout_ PEPROCESS Process)
Removes the primary token of a process.
Definition: token.c:936
POBJECT_TYPE PsProcessType
Definition: process.c:20
NTSTATUS NTAPI PsOpenTokenOfProcess(IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, OUT PACCESS_TOKEN *Token)
Definition: security.c:471
NTSTATUS NTAPI PspSetPrimaryToken(IN PEPROCESS Process, IN HANDLE TokenHandle OPTIONAL, IN PACCESS_TOKEN Token OPTIONAL)
Definition: security.c:215
NTSTATUS NTAPI PsAssignImpersonationToken(IN PETHREAD Thread, IN HANDLE TokenHandle)
Definition: security.c:502
PACCESS_TOKEN NTAPI PsReferenceEffectiveToken(IN PETHREAD Thread, OUT IN PTOKEN_TYPE TokenType, OUT PBOOLEAN EffectiveOnly, OUT PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel)
Definition: security.c:780
VOID NTAPI PsRevertToSelf(VOID)
Definition: security.c:556
NTSTATUS NTAPI PspWriteTebImpersonationInfo(IN PETHREAD Thread, IN PETHREAD CurrentThread)
Definition: security.c:114
NTSTATUS NTAPI NtOpenProcessToken(IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle)
Definition: security.c:350
NTSTATUS NTAPI PspInitializeProcessSecurity(IN PEPROCESS Process, IN PEPROCESS Parent OPTIONAL)
Definition: security.c:71
NTSTATUS NTAPI PspAssignPrimaryToken(IN PEPROCESS Process, IN HANDLE Token, IN PACCESS_TOKEN AccessToken OPTIONAL)
Definition: security.c:178
VOID NTAPI PsRevertThreadToSelf(IN PETHREAD Thread)
Definition: security.c:568
BOOLEAN NTAPI PsDisableImpersonation(IN PETHREAD Thread, OUT PSE_IMPERSONATION_STATE ImpersonationState)
Definition: security.c:915
VOID NTAPI PsRestoreImpersonation(IN PETHREAD Thread, IN PSE_IMPERSONATION_STATE ImpersonationState)
Definition: security.c:965
VOID NTAPI SeAssignPrimaryToken(IN PEPROCESS Process, IN PTOKEN Token)
PACCESS_TOKEN NTAPI PsReferencePrimaryToken(PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: security.c:440
VOID NTAPI PspDeleteProcessSecurity(IN PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: security.c:30
PACCESS_TOKEN NTAPI PsReferenceImpersonationToken(IN PETHREAD Thread, OUT PBOOLEAN CopyOnOpen, OUT PBOOLEAN EffectiveOnly, OUT PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel)
Definition: security.c:849
NTSTATUS NTAPI NtImpersonateThread(IN HANDLE ThreadHandle, IN HANDLE ThreadToImpersonateHandle, IN PSECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE SecurityQualityOfService)
Definition: security.c:1014
NTSTATUS NTAPI PsImpersonateClient(IN PETHREAD Thread, IN PACCESS_TOKEN Token, IN BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen, IN BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly, IN SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel)
Definition: security.c:610
NTSTATUS NTAPI NtOpenProcessTokenEx(IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, IN ULONG HandleAttributes, OUT PHANDLE TokenHandle)
Definition: security.c:366
PTOKEN PspBootAccessToken
Definition: security.c:17
VOID NTAPI PspDeleteThreadSecurity(IN PETHREAD Thread)
Definition: security.c:46
POBJECT_TYPE PsThreadType
Definition: thread.c:20
BOOLEAN NTAPI SeSinglePrivilegeCheck(_In_ LUID PrivilegeValue, _In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode)
Checks if a single privilege is present in the context of the calling thread.
Definition: priv.c:744
SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL NTAPI SeTokenImpersonationLevel(_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
Gathers the security impersonation level of an access token.
Definition: token.c:1846
BOOLEAN NTAPI SeTokenIsAdmin(_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
Determines if a token is either an admin token or not. Such condition is checked based upon TOKEN_HAS...
Definition: token.c:1890
POBJECT_TYPE SeTokenObjectType
Definition: token.c:17
BOOLEAN NTAPI SeTokenIsRestricted(_In_ PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
Determines if a token is restricted or not, based upon the token flags.
Definition: token.c:1913
PVOID *typedef PHANDLE
Definition: ntsecpkg.h:455
#define STATUS_BAD_TOKEN_TYPE
Definition: ntstatus.h:404
PVOID FASTCALL ObFastReferenceObject(IN PEX_FAST_REF FastRef)
Definition: obref.c:132
VOID NTAPI ObDereferenceDeviceMap(IN PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: devicemap.c:456
VOID FASTCALL ObInitializeFastReference(IN PEX_FAST_REF FastRef, IN PVOID Object)
Definition: obref.c:107
ULONG NTAPI ObIsLUIDDeviceMapsEnabled(VOID)
Definition: devicemap.c:662
PVOID FASTCALL ObFastReferenceObjectLocked(IN PEX_FAST_REF FastRef)
Definition: obref.c:119
VOID FASTCALL ObFastDereferenceObject(IN PEX_FAST_REF FastRef, IN PVOID Object)
Definition: obref.c:167
FORCEINLINE ULONG ObpValidateAttributes(IN ULONG Attributes, IN KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode)
Definition: ob_x.h:22
NTSTATUS NTAPI ObOpenObjectByPointer(IN PVOID Object, IN ULONG HandleAttributes, IN PACCESS_STATE PassedAccessState, IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, IN POBJECT_TYPE ObjectType, IN KPROCESSOR_MODE AccessMode, OUT PHANDLE Handle)
Definition: obhandle.c:2742
NTSTATUS NTAPI ObReferenceObjectByHandle(IN HANDLE Handle, IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, IN POBJECT_TYPE ObjectType, IN KPROCESSOR_MODE AccessMode, OUT PVOID *Object, OUT POBJECT_HANDLE_INFORMATION HandleInformation OPTIONAL)
Definition: obref.c:494
NTSTATUS NTAPI ObGetObjectSecurity(IN PVOID Object, OUT PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *SecurityDescriptor, OUT PBOOLEAN MemoryAllocated)
Definition: obsecure.c:611
VOID NTAPI ObReleaseObjectSecurity(IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor, IN BOOLEAN MemoryAllocated)
Definition: obsecure.c:709
long LONG
Definition: pedump.c:60
VOID NTAPI KeStackAttachProcess(IN PKPROCESS Process, OUT PRKAPC_STATE ApcState)
Definition: procobj.c:704
VOID NTAPI KeUnstackDetachProcess(IN PRKAPC_STATE ApcState)
Definition: procobj.c:756
#define PSTRACE(x, fmt,...)
Definition: ps.h:57
#define PS_SECURITY_DEBUG
Definition: ps.h:19
FORCEINLINE VOID PspUnlockProcessSecurityExclusive(IN PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: ps_x.h:144
FORCEINLINE VOID PspUnlockThreadSecurityShared(IN PETHREAD Thread)
Definition: ps_x.h:166
FORCEINLINE VOID PspLockThreadSecurityExclusive(IN PETHREAD Thread)
Definition: ps_x.h:177
#define PspSetCrossThreadFlag(Thread, Flag)
Definition: ps_x.h:25
FORCEINLINE VOID PspUnlockProcessSecurityShared(IN PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: ps_x.h:122
FORCEINLINE VOID PspUnlockThreadSecurityExclusive(IN PETHREAD Thread)
Definition: ps_x.h:188
#define PspClearCrossThreadFlag(Thread, Flag)
Definition: ps_x.h:27
FORCEINLINE VOID PspLockProcessSecurityExclusive(IN PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: ps_x.h:133
FORCEINLINE VOID PspLockThreadSecurityShared(IN PETHREAD Thread)
Definition: ps_x.h:155
FORCEINLINE VOID PspLockProcessSecurityShared(IN PEPROCESS Process)
Definition: ps_x.h:111
#define _SEH2_GetExceptionCode()
Definition: pseh2_64.h:159
#define _SEH2_EXCEPT(...)
Definition: pseh2_64.h:34
#define _SEH2_YIELD(__stmt)
Definition: pseh2_64.h:162
#define ProbeForWriteHandle(Ptr)
Definition: probe.h:43
#define STATUS_SUCCESS
Definition: shellext.h:65
PULONG MinorVersion OPTIONAL
Definition: CrossNt.h:68
ULONG SecurityLimitFlags
Definition: pstypes.h:1500
PPS_JOB_TOKEN_FILTER Filter
Definition: pstypes.h:1502
PPS_IMPERSONATION_INFORMATION ImpersonationInfo
Definition: pstypes.h:1143
KTHREAD Tcb
Definition: pstypes.h:1103
EX_RUNDOWN_REF RundownProtect
Definition: pstypes.h:1159
ULONG ActiveImpersonationInfo
Definition: pstypes.h:1181
PVOID Teb
Definition: ketypes.h:1747
KAPC_STATE ApcState
Definition: ketypes.h:1718
GENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping
Definition: obtypes.h:358
OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER TypeInfo
Definition: obtypes.h:390
SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel
Definition: pstypes.h:1072
PACCESS_TOKEN Token
Definition: setypes.h:116
SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL Level
Definition: setypes.h:119
Definition: compat.h:836
ULONG IsImpersonating
Definition: winternl.h:433
ULONG ImpersonationLocale
Definition: winternl.h:432
#define TAG_PS_IMPERSONATION
Definition: tag.h:133
unsigned char * PBOOLEAN
Definition: typedefs.h:53
#define NTAPI
Definition: typedefs.h:36
#define IN
Definition: typedefs.h:39
uint32_t ULONG
Definition: typedefs.h:59
#define OUT
Definition: typedefs.h:40
#define STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
Definition: udferr_usr.h:145
#define STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL
Definition: udferr_usr.h:132
#define STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
Definition: udferr_usr.h:158
static BOOL Attached
Definition: vidbios.c:3905
_Must_inspect_result_ _In_ WDFDEVICE _In_ ULONG _In_ ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess
Definition: wdfdevice.h:2658
_In_ USHORT _In_ ULONG _In_ PSOCKADDR _In_ PSOCKADDR _Reserved_ ULONG _In_opt_ PVOID _In_opt_ const WSK_CLIENT_CONNECTION_DISPATCH _In_opt_ PEPROCESS _In_opt_ PETHREAD _In_opt_ PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor
Definition: wsk.h:191
_At_(*)(_In_ PWSK_CLIENT Client, _In_opt_ PUNICODE_STRING NodeName, _In_opt_ PUNICODE_STRING ServiceName, _In_opt_ ULONG NameSpace, _In_opt_ GUID *Provider, _In_opt_ PADDRINFOEXW Hints, _Outptr_ PADDRINFOEXW *Result, _In_opt_ PEPROCESS OwningProcess, _In_opt_ PETHREAD OwningThread, _Inout_ PIRP Irp Result)(Mem)) NTSTATUS(WSKAPI *PFN_WSK_GET_ADDRESS_INFO
Definition: wsk.h:426
CCHAR KPROCESSOR_MODE
Definition: ketypes.h:7
KAPC_STATE
Definition: ketypes.h:1285
#define ObDereferenceObject
Definition: obfuncs.h:203
#define ObReferenceObject
Definition: obfuncs.h:204
_Out_ PBOOLEAN CopyOnOpen
Definition: psfuncs.h:154
_Inout_ PSE_IMPERSONATION_STATE ImpersonationState
Definition: psfuncs.h:189
_Out_ PBOOLEAN _Out_ PBOOLEAN _Out_ PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel
Definition: psfuncs.h:156
_In_ PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT _In_ BOOLEAN _In_ ACCESS_MASK _In_ ACCESS_MASK _Outptr_opt_ PPRIVILEGE_SET _In_ PGENERIC_MAPPING _In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE _Out_ PACCESS_MASK _Out_ PNTSTATUS AccessStatus
Definition: sefuncs.h:21
_In_ KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode
Definition: sefuncs.h:103
#define TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY
Definition: setypes.h:921
#define TOKEN_IMPERSONATE
Definition: setypes.h:923
enum _TOKEN_TYPE * PTOKEN_TYPE